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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to understand the role of today’s accounting requirements for financial
intermediaries (banks and insurers), to be aware of their limitations and to underscore the need
for reform in order to foster long-term and then low-carbon capital spending in Europe. The paper
shows that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) can affect long-term asset
allocation of banks and insurance companies. International accounting standards do not
differentiate between low and carbon intensive investment and do not take into account climate
risks beforehand. To tackle these issues, we make some recommendations to promote long-term
and low-carbon investment.
1. Introduction
While capital investment, both private and public, is
supposed to have a powerful knock-on effect on
economic growth, we observe a falloff in the global
rate of investment (gross fixed capital formation)
during these past three decades. This rate dropped
from 26.1% of world GDP (Gross Domestic Product)
in 1974 to 21.8% in 2009, representing a cumulative
decline of roughly $20 trillion [1]. The decline, which
was concentrated in developed countries, has
accelerated since the 2007 crisis. For example,
investment in the euro zone decreased from 26% of
GDP in 1970 to 18% in 2013. The European
Commission estimates that between 2010 and 2020 the
European Union will need to invest approximately
€1.6 trillion in infrastructure for cross-border transport
of goods, people and energy. The energy transition
will likewise involve spending from 2% to 3% of GDP
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over a ten-year period. In the case of Europe, that will
mean spending roughly €3 trillion in the course of a
decade [Roadmap, 2050]. This decline in investment
has proven to be a drag on economic growth. From
2000 to 2008, output grew 2% in the developed
countries against 5.3% in the years from 1960 to 1970
[1]. Both the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) and the IMF
(International Monetary Fund) have in fact stressed the
sluggish pace of investment recovery in Europe.
Capital investment and low-carbon investment in
particular can be considered a prerequisite to a return
to strong, sustainable, job-rich growth [2].
Indeed, climate change is one of the most important
issues facing developed and emerging countries.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report (2014) each of the last three decades
has been successively warmer at the earth’s surface than
1 Corresponding author e-mail: sandra.rigot@univ-paris13.fr
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any preceding decade since 1850. The increased energy
stored in our warming atmosphere has the potential to
have enduring economic, social, and financial
consequences. The IPCC also states that some regions will
experience more extreme heat while others may cool
slightly. This could result in flooding, drought and intense
summer heat, violent storms and other extreme weather
events. Moreover, our current understanding of the
potential financial risks posed by climate change to
companies, investors, and the financial system is still at an
early stage. The large-scale and long-term nature of the
problem makes it challenging, especially in the context of
long-term economic decisions. There is a need for define
long-term investing beforehand.
What makes defining long-term investment such a
crucial issue is that there is no legal, much less
universal, definition of the term. The definition we will
retain for long-term investing is based on three
complementary facets of the concept of long-term
investing [3]. A definition of long-term investing based
on these three complementary facetsi will form the
analytical framework for identifying potential short-
term bias in the accounting rules that apply to banks
and insurance companies. The first facet related to the
nature of the investment project rests on the
assumption that long-term investment involves
investing in capital assets (carbon and low-carbon
investment) to be distinguished from financial capital.
The second facet can be apprehended through the
nature of savings and nature of long-term financing
instrument. Long-term savings should rank highest, as
they involve lower liquidity constraints for providers
of funds. Long-term vehicles should be promoted for
financing long-term investment projects. The third
facet focused on defining long-term behaviour and
how it differs from short-term behaviour via
countercyclical investment strategies (as opposed to
momentum management) and low portfolio turnover
and via the promotion of partnership-based governance,
both for asset management purposes of the companies
in which they invest their own funds (instead of
shareholder value governance).
This decrease in investment can be attributed to
changes in the demand and supply of capital. Long-term
investment and low-carbon investment depend on both
available funding and corporate decisions. In terms of
capital demand, the key challenge today is to achieve the
kind of innovation (radical and incremental) that will
contribute to a successful energy transition (above all to
a low-carbon economy). In terms of capital supply, the
contrast between weak investment and plentiful savings
can be analysed as inefficient allocation of savings,
resulting from the short-term bias of market participants
and the most important financial intermediaries. On this
point, there has been a rough consensus for some time in
academic literature, along with growing awareness
among finance professionals (like Larry Fink, the
Chairman and Chief Executive of BlackRockii),
regulators (Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the US
Federal Reserve or Lord Adair Turner, former Chairman
of the UK’s Financial Services Authorityiii) and
academics. The latter questioned the economic
usefulness of financial innovations [4] or the positive
correlation between the size of the financial services
sector and economic growth [5–9].
Among the explanations advanced for short-
termismiv is that regulatory requirements may
encourage financial intermediaries (banks, insurers…)
who might otherwise finance long-term investments, to
adopt a short-term bias. Indeed, they are submitted to a
regulatory framework that imposes varying degrees of
requirements that evolve over time. Among these
requirements, there are IFRS accounting standards
(International Financial Reporting Standards). If they
are supposed to enhance transparency needed to
improve the resilience of the financial system, the
question is the following: could the accounting
requirements be in danger of hindering long-term
investment and low-carbon financing?
The aim of this paper is to offer a different slant on
this issue by seeking to identify short-term bias in the
accounting standards that apply to banks and insurance
companies – the primary providers of corporate funding.
Because it is particularly hard to quantify the impact of
i The European Commission seems to have endorsed a number of these conditions for investing under the European Long-Term Investment Fund (ELTIF)
regulation, which entered into force in December 2015. Examples include a five-year investment period, which amounts to introducing a certain amount
of illiquidity into asset management, and the specification that long-term financing through such funds should go to real-economy assets, not to mention
the prohibition of certain financial innovations.
ii American global investment management manager.
iii UK financial watchdog.
iv Another possible explanation has to do with the growing number of management mandates given to competing external asset managers, who have an
incentive to seek short-term rather than long-term returns. By making the investment chain longer and more complex, the expanding role for asset
managers has not only contributed to lower investor involvement with business management; it has also raised the cost to agents in need of funding and
led to asymmetric risk taking. 
a given accounting requirement, we have opted for a
qualitative approach to identify the direct and indirect
impact of those reforms on the intermediation activity of
banks and insurance companies (lending and asset
allocation).
Section 2 presents the international accounting
requirements of financial intermediaries. Section 3
introduces the various research methods used in the
paper and the nature of qualitative data collected.
Section 4 presents the main negative effects of IFRS on
long-term investment funding by banks and insurance
companies. Section 5 concludes.
2. International accounting requirements and
theoretical framework
2.1. International accounting requirements
Since 2005, all quoted European firms must apply IFRS
standards to present their financial statements. These
standards replace national accounting rules (which stay
in application for unquoted and small firms). IFRS
standards are based on a conceptual framework that
encompasses all the major principles that must guide the
development of accounting standards. This framework
stipulates that the financial statements must comply with
the information needs of current and potential investors
[10]. In order to produce financial statements that are in
line with investors’ needs, the IASB (International
Accounting Standard Board- International standard
setter) promotes accounting combining valuations at
cost and fair value, but it is this second model that
appears to be preferential. This predominance of fair
value accounting in the IFRS model is particularly
significant in terms of both short and long-term
investment valuations. The IFRS standards are intended
to be applied by all companies regardless of their sector
of activity in order to provide the reader relevant and
comparable information for economic decision-making.
The valuation and accounting of long-term
investments is primarily governed by the financial
instruments standards. IAS 39 is applicable for financial
years beginning before January 1, 2018, but after this
date IFRS 9 applies, except for the insurance sector
which obtained an exemption until 2021, given the
importance of investment portfolios. Generally speaking,
these two standards propose a mixed approach of
accounting valuation: namely the historical cost and the
fair value. However, in practice, they have an approach
that favours valuation at fair value in order to
disseminate relevant information for investors. The main
difference between these two standards is based on the
conditions of application of one or the other method.
While IAS 39 allows a very restrictive use of the
historical cost method, IFRS 9 allows more flexibility in
the choice of the valuation model. It should be noted that,
whatever the standard, the standard setter considers that
only assets with a defined maturity (such as bonds) can
be considered in the medium or long term; other assets
(listed shares, private equity, infrastructure shares) are
considered as short-term assets in connection with the
fair value measurement. Regarding loans granted by
banks, IAS 39 allows for their exclusive recognition at
historical cost, whereas IFRS 9 requires that the
characteristics of the loan (duration and type of interest
rate) be taken into account in order to determine the
valuation method.
But this standard do not differentiate between low-
carbon and carbon investment concerning assessment of
assets. Indeed actually, IFRS does not regulate the
accounting of environmental risks or the disclosure of
information relating to responsible investment. While
some environmental or societal issues may indirectly
appear in the IFRS accounts through some standards
(IAS 1, IAS 37 for example), there are no specific rules in
this area. Moreover, it can be noticed that the IASB texts
often refer to the environment in an economic or
technological context but never in the sense of natural
risks. The measurement and recognition of low-carbon
investment is mainly affected by IAS 36 - Impairment of
assets and IAS 37- Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and
Contingent Assets. These last ones are a rarity because
they outlines the accounting for provisions (liabilities of
uncertain timing or amount), together with contingent
assets (possible assets) and contingent liabilities (possible
obligations and present obligations that are not probable
or not reliably measurable), for example the cost of clean-
up in case of offending environmental damages or the
dismantling of polluting installation (nuclear or oil). Our
study emphasizes that climate risk which can be divided
into physical risk and transition risk is only considered
afterwards (once assets are stranded) and not beforehand
(that is to say there is no specific accounting treatment not
to penalize low-carbon investments).
2.2. Theoretical framework
IFRS standards are in line with the agency theory, which
advocates reducing information asymmetry between
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firms’ shareholders and managers. In fact IFRS standards
aim to provide the best information to current and
potential investors in order that they take economic
decisions (purchase/sale of securities). IFRS standards are
also in line with the efficient market hypothesis which
postulate that market prices always reflect all available
information instantaneously [11]. The use of fair value
measurement, based on current market price, as the
primary approach to measurement assumes that market
prices provide accurate information enabling the best
allocation of resources. That approach is supposed to
convey a transparent, verifiable information that is
relevant to decision-making.
Some empirical researchv shows that fair value
accounting increases the relevance of accounting
information for investors, as compared with amortised
cost accounting. To assess the quality of fair value
information, these researches have specifically examined
its impact on either a company’s share price or the market
value of its equity (using a statistical regression model).
Most of the results, however, have only limited validity,
as they are based only on portfolios of quoted equity
instruments (there has been little or no research on other
products such as bonds and alternative asset classes).
More consequentially, the authors have been unable to
prove indisputably that fair value measurement is superior
to measurement at cost. Furthermore, the results are not
statistically significant and explanatory variables may
have been omitted. Some studies also point out negative
effects of fair value accounting, such as higher volatility.
Detractors of fair value accounting emphasise its
effect on financial statements and on the behaviour of
both investors and managers [18–24]. They show that
fair value accounting introduces more volatility into
financial statements (through the valuation of portfolios
and equity, where fair value re-measurements are
recognised). This effect is particularly important for
medium- and long-term investments that should
normally remain on the company’s books for a long
period. Moreover, fair value accounting seems to induce
procyclical and short-termist strategies. Faced with
volatile financial information, market participants react
instantly (with momentum strategies) and abandon their
initial long-term strategies. We can notice that to our
knowledge there is no academic research on the impact
of IFRS standards or fair value accounting on low-
carbon or responsible investment, certainly due to the
fact that these standards ignore those issues.
3. Data and methodology
Our research is based on qualitative analysis. First, we
conducted 60 semi-structured interviewsvi at financial
institutions from April 2013 to September 2015. The
diversity of the respondents led to the collection of a
sufficient amount of empirical information to identify if
IFRS standards are an incentive or a constraint for long-
term investment. All the interviews were conducted
under a confidentiality agreement on the information
retained and on the identity of the interviewee; this
allows a more open debate. The interviews were
conducted using an interview guide. The principle of the
semi-structured interview allows researchers to ask
additional questions based on the progress of each
conversation. The interviews ranged from 40 to
160 minutes. They were fully recorded, transcribed and
then validated by the interviewees. The transcripts were
coded by researchers with the N’Vivo 10 software. This
tool helps to organize and rationalize the coding process.
It enables us to easily compare and find data theme in our
corpus. At first, in accordance with the recommendations
of [25], we made an open coding based on the themes of
the interview guide, and then in the second step we made
an axial coding to identify relationships between
different levels of coding and link them to the problem of
long-term investment. The coding scheme was
conducted jointly by researchers. The findings synthesis
corresponds to the most frequently raised theme by
respondents to characterize accounting rules for long-
term investment in the insurance industry context.
In addition, we have established a qualitative database
from responses to the Public Consultation launched by the
European Commission on its Green Paper on the long-
term financing of the European economy, made public in
March 2013. Green papers typically present a range of
ideas with the aim of initiating Europe-wide consultation
on a specific issue. Interested parties, organisations and
individuals are encouraged to submit their views in
writing before a given deadline. The Green Paper raised
30 questions, among them the definition of long-term
investment, the role of banks and institutional investors in
long-term financing, the impact on long-term investment
of prudential and accounting regulation for financial
intermediaries. We have consolidated the 11 categories
identified by the European Commission into 5 large
groups of respondents: financial intermediaries (banks,
insurance companies, pension funds and other investment
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v [12–17].
vi Banks (23), insurance companies (18), pension funds (11), regulators and standard-setting bodies (9), consulting and other firms (13).
funds), market intermediaries (auditors, accountants,
consultants, financial market participants, regulatory and
oversight bodies, civil society, and non-financial
companies. Given the number of respondents, the range
of sectors in which they operate and their diverse national
backgrounds, our database can be considered a
representative as European sample. In this paper, we
focus on the question related to the impact of fair value
accounting on long-term investment (question 20).
During the study period, IAS 39 was still in force and
IFRS 9 under discussion. The latter was published in
July 2014 before the end of the research. Our study is
therefore able to understand all the issues of these two
standards in terms of long-term investment for
stakeholders (banks and insurance companies).
We have examined the responses of the full range of
stakeholders (e.g., investors, banks, insurance
companies, and regulators), clearly rendering their
opinions and analysing them against the findings in the
academic literature. While there is a body of theoretical
and empirical research that seeks to demonstrate the
beneficial effects of fair-value accounting on
transparency or of prudential standards on financial
stability, very few studies have focused on the
connection to investment and low-carbon investment.
4. The impact of accounting standards on long-
term and low-carbon investment
We find broad consensus on the idea that long-term
investing and financing are primarily affected by fair
value accounting promoted by IFRS. Indeed, both
responses to the Green Paper and semi-structured
interviews have brought to light the common impacts to
both sectors, as well as those that are specific to banking
and to insurance sectors.
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Table 1: Firms and interviewees
Firms and number of interviewees 
BNPP Group (4) SwissLife (1) ACPR (2) Cabinet Ricol et Lasterie (3)
BNPP CBI (1) BNPP Cardif (3) ANC (2) PWC (1)
BNP Investment solutions (1) Générali (1) IASB (1) Deloite (1)
BPCE (1) SMABTP (1) IFRIC (1) Premium consulting (1)
BPI France (2) AG2R La Mondiale (1) European Commission (3) Fixage (1)
BSI Bank (1) Crédit agricole Predica (2) EFRAG (1) Insti7 (2)
Caisse des dépôts et consignations (4) Axa private equity (1) AF2I (1)
Crédit agricole (1) CNP(2) 2PM asset management (1)
European Bank of Investment (1) French insurer Association (1) Allen & Overy (1)
Fédération bancaire française (1) Macif (1) OCDE (1)
La Banque Postale (1) AXA (2) Paris 10 University (1)
SCOR (1)
Groupama asset management (1)
Positions of interviewees
General directors (4)/ Professional association presidents (2) Risks directors (3) Professors (2)
Financial directors (2) Project managers (6) Members of standard setter (3)
Accounting directors (7) Portfolio managers (1) Other functions (10)
Accounting standards directors (8) Consultants (7) Auditors (2)
Accounting and prudential standards directors (2) Lawyers (1)
Total duration of interviews: 137h
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the qualitative database
Question 20 of the Green paper: To what extent do you
consider that the use of fair value accounting principles has led
to short-termism in investor behaviour? What alternatives or
other ways to compensate for such effects could be suggested?
(Number of respondents)
Received by the European Commission 292
Treated (available in English or French) 257
That answered to question 20 144
– from financial intermediaries (bank, insurance…) 66
– from market intermediaries 26
– from European institutions 31
– from French institutions 28
– from British institutions 24
– from German institutions 13
On the one hand, among financial intermediaries
(banking, insurance, pension and other investors), non-
financial corporations and non-professional account
readers, the majority believe that fair value is short-term.
On the other hand, the position of market intermediaries
(regulators and consultants/analysts/auditors/accountants)
is more divided with those who consider non-short-term
fair value having a slight advantage.
The support of the standard setters and accounting
regulators can be understood in terms of relevant
objectives and transparency of information, the latter
considering that the reference to an observable market
value is more difficult to manipulate and more useful for
the decision-making than value at amortized cost that may
be influenced by managerial decisions. This point of view
is also consistent with the theoretical anchoring of current
accounting standards that favour the investor as a
recipient of accounting information in their conceptual
framework, and that are based on the supposed efficiency
of the markets. The attractiveness of fair value for
business accounts readers, understood as the market
value, can be explained by their desire to have
comparable and reliable financial information between
companies, and the use of a single reference for all
companies can meet this requirement. As for the
preparers of accounts, their opposition to fair value
accounting can be explained by the difficulty of valuing
certain assets and especially the inadequate representation
of their performance.
4.1. General negative impacts on long-term
investment
To begin with, we find that IAS 39 (financial
instruments) has not affected long-term financing
activity by banks. The standard calls for measuring
loans and receivables at amortised cost (similarly to
French GAAP), which makes possible long-term
management of such portfolios.
ο “Regarding the accounting of loans according to
IAS 39: there is no subject” (Member of the
French standard setter).
In the case of long-term investing by banks and
insurance companies, we observe a number of effects,
some reflecting the low suitability of IFRS in their
current form to the insurance business, and others
pertaining to financial statements and the behaviour of
insurance fund managers.
For example we identify impacts of accounting rules
on the behaviour of market and investment managers.
Indeed IFRS standards driven by fair value accounting
have three negative effects, which is particularly
emphasize by the professionals interviewed:
First the introduction of higher volatility in the
financial statement (balance sheet and income
statement) due to the variation of investment
measured by fair value that reflect market variations.
This volatility is detrimental for the ownership of
long-term assets, indeed their price vary at each
closing date without reflecting their long term value.
Those re-measurements reflect changes in the market
rather than in the actual performance of long-term
investments.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics related to the accounting question 20 of the Green paper
To what extent do you consider that the use of fair value 
accounting principles has led to short-termism in Fair value is Fair Value is 
investor behaviour? short-termist not short-termist No response Total
Financial intermediaries (Banks, insurance, Investors, Pension funds) 42 11 13 66
Market intermediaries 10 12 4 26
Regulator and standard setter 4 9 2 15
Other sectors 22 4 11 37
Total 78 37 29 144
Table 4: Short-termism of FV accounting: the
arguments of respondents
Why Fair value (FV) accounting is % of respondents 
short-termist? to the question 20
FV increases volatility 55%
FV reduces attractiveness for investors/Managers 55%
FV increases procyclicality effect 32%
FV increases difficulties for FV measurement 27%
FV does not suit for long-term asset/backed to 
long term liabilities 26%
FV is correct for short-term business 18%
FV does not suit for infrastructure/Real estate assets 6%
ο “When the IASB only proposes fair value as an
evaluation method, we are against it, because we
consider that, as we have a long-term activity, we
cannot take into account in our income statement,
the impact of real-time market valuation, as it
does not reflect our activity; to the extent that we
manage contracts over the long term, we do not
have to be subject to these market fluctuations”
(Insurance, Accounting Manager)
ο “Completely fair value and therefore volatile
performance measures leads, would lead, and
will lead insurers to reduce the amount of risky
investments (especially stocks), so as not to be
subject to stock market fluctuations” (Insurance,
association professional).
ο “We must be positioned on assets where we
control volatility, we must reposition ourselves
on assets whose market value may ultimately be
better controlled” (Insurance, Deputy Chief
Accounting Officer).
The increase in volatility is particularly detrimental
for long-term environmental investments because they
have particularly long deadlines (dismantling power
station). An annual assessment of their instantaneous
value does not make sense and on the contrary could
lead readers of the accounts to misunderstand the quality
of the investment.
Then investors and managers adopt a short-term
behaviour: confronted with fluctuations in long-term
investments, insurance fund managers adopt momentum
strategies and review their asset allocation more
frequently, with the result that the holding period for
long-term assets has become shorter.
ο “The philosophy of IFRS, is based on the
following question: “if I scrap the business
today, how much is it worth?” So it’s
instantaneous value. It’s not taking into account
future events, what’s going to happen in the
future, it’s really today’s scrap value, and they
do not take time into account. (Insurance,
Director General)
ο “We have an asset realization schedule that takes
time into account and this vision of fair value in
the very short term narrows our horizon and
constrains us” (Bank-Insurance, Head of
Accounting and Prudential Standards)
ο “Fair value accounting leads to a considerably
shorter time horizon” (Insurance, Investment
Director).
Shortening investment horizons for institutional
investors may have implications for financial investments
where physical and low-carbon investments may be
longer-term and riskier than traditional investments.
At last fair value accounting create a procyclicalvii
effect that conduct to bubble phenomenon: Fund
managers adopt procyclical behaviour in that they adjust
their investment strategies to reflect changes in the
market value of assets. Bull and bear market cycles
become more pronounced as a consequence.
ο “The biggest problem with fair value
accounting standards is clearly the risk of
procyclicality. Having accounting standards
without buffering leads to a lot of
procyclicality, that is, as soon as there is an
imbalance between assets and liabilities, this
leads the actors to take immediate action
“(Insurance, Director of Investments).
ο “A good system of financial regulation should
be counter-cyclical, transactions ought to be
registered with even more care so that the
measures would be euphoric” (Consultant).
Interviewees and respondents of the Green Paper
consider that this valuation model reduces overall
attractiveness for investors that is to say decreases their
willingness to invest in long-term assets.
Indeed investors, having information biased by
instantaneous market fluctuations, are led to adopt
momentum decisions that disregard the initial holding
horizon and the real performances of the firms.
Moreover they adopt a behaviour related to market
variations that leads to procyclicality.
ο “The issue now is that financial security should be
guaranteed and that there is a need to develop
mechanisms which avoid aggravating the
amplification of the system. But if you support
sustain fair value liabilities, then they have to live
within the time: there, you add to the pro-
cyclicality” (Assurance, Director General).
It appears that, for green paper respondents and
interviewees, fair value accounting is aimed at current
and potential investors in order to enable them to make
relevant economic decisions in the immediate future,
which does not correspond to the needs of long-term
investors.
These results support earlier researches to
demonstrate the negative impacts of fair value
accounting on financial statements and manager’s
behaviour [20–22, 24].
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vii procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic cycle. Increased procyclicality thus simply
means fluctuations with broader amplitude.
Our study also put in evidence that IFRS standards
have different effects on financial instruments which
support long-term investments. What emerges from our
analysis is that IFRS standards tend:
– to put stable, countercyclical investments in
stocks and alternative assets at a disadvantage
ο “Besides, it is still critical that strategic
investments in equity are disadvantaged as
the gains/losses being realized at sale
cannot be recognised in net income; thus
the so called recycling is prohibited. The
adjustment of this inappropriate accounting
treatment in IFRS 9 would encourage
insurers to enlarge their investments in
equity instruments. Thus, we suggest
moving towards the IASB allowing
recycling at derecognition” (extract of the
answer of Standard life to the Green paper).
ο “In fact, we are going to find a strong
impact of fair value on so-called
diversification categories. That is to say,
especially the equity part, but also on
alternatives, infrastructure, etc., and
derivative instruments that for accounting
purposes are significantly less profitable
“(Insurance, Director of Investments).
– to put plain vanillaviii and bond investments at an
advantage
ο “80% of our bond portfolio will move to
cost under IFRS 9, while it was valued in
fair value under IAS 39” (Chief Accountant
Bank).
– to have a neutral effect on the majority of loan
portfolios and an adverse effect on non-plain
vanilla loans
ο “According to IFRS 9, the banking book is
at cost, so there is no subject for us.”
(Accounting director).
It appears that IFRS regulation can nevertheless
favour the investment in green bonds since these can be
evaluated at cost according to their business model.
The drive for transparency and neutrality that
predominates in these standards contributes to a
snapshot view of portfolios that conflicts with the kind
of long-term financing required by long-term
investment projects. This analysis is in line with the
report issued by the European Commission in July 2017.
According to this report, IFRS standards may have
detrimental impact on responsible investment (referring
to the potential impacts of IFRS 9). In concluding that it
is important for the international standard-setter to take
environmental issues into account in its framework [26].
4.2. Recommendations: the creation of a long-term
accounting category
Our results highlight the difficulties created by IFRS for
those managing assets held for the long-term and
sustainable growth. Based on these points and our review
of the literature, we put forward proposals for how the
IFRS standard-setting process can take the special
features of long-term investing more adequately into
account. Underpinning our proposals is the asymmetric
prudence principle, which calls for recognising
unrealised losses only, but not unrealised gains. That
outlook stands in contrast to the view of prudence upheld
by the IASB, which can be equated with a neutrality
principle that leads to recognition of both unrealised
gains and losses. We propose to create a new accounting
category for long-term and low-carbon investment. The
idea of adapting IFRS standards to take greater account
of long-term investment is cited by 21 respondents. They
believe that taking into account long-holding periods is a
prerequisite for accounting standards to convey a
coherent representation of the economic reality.
However, they do not offer solutions for doing this. It
was during the interview phase that we were able to
identify the key features of such an accounting category.
This new category could be applied to all investors
but a number of conditions relating to actual investor
behaviour (facet 3 of long-term investing definition) and
the nature of investment could be included (facet 1).
• Measurement at cost accompanied by a
provisioning model that permits recognition of
unrealised losses.
• Choice of a 5-year minimum holding period.
• Priority to low-carbon investments or
investments in innovative companies.
• Mandatory disclosures of the following
information in the notes to the financial
statements: the composition of the portfolio, the
exposures in carbon investment and low-carbon
investment, changes in that composition with
justification provided for rebalancing and the
fair value of the assets held.
This new long-term accounting category must
provide an increase of long-term investment and low-
carbon investment by relaxing the accounting
constraints on investment.
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viii Simple instrument that only corresponds to refund of principal and interest.
5. Conclusion
Our research into the impact of IFRS on long-
term/low-carbon investment and financing by banks
and insurance companies shows that those accounting
standards affect different financial intermediaries in
different ways. We would accordingly argue that the
effect of those standards is not neutral (higher
volatility, short-termism behaviour and procyclicality),
and can even be adverse in the case of certain
investments (particularly equities and alternative asset
classes). Moreover the fact that accounting standards
do not take into account environmental risks is a
critical issue for the development of a sustainable
economy. As noticed by the European commission, it
is important that accounting framework evolves to
reflect all financial and environmental information
needed by investors [26]. 
To address these factors and make accounting standards
more supportive of long-term and low-carbon investment,
we propose using the asymmetric prudence principle and
creating an accounting category that allows certain types
of investments with a long time horizon (stocks, private
equity and infrastructure investments, low-carbon
investments) to be measured at cost. The question of low
carbon investments is a crucial issue because the
environmental issue and its impact on the financial
statements is no longer an ecological question. By the way,
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published a set of
recommendations aimed at all companies in order to
improve the disclosures of financial information on the
impacts of climate risks and opportunities [27].
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